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Book Reviews
LAWYERS AND THE COURTS, A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF THE
ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 1750-1965, BY BRIAN ABEL-SMITH AND
ROBERT STEVENS. HEINEMANN, LONDON, pp. xiv, 504, 1967.
Professors Smith and Stevens have written a book of great im-
portance. They have made a lengthy survey of English legal services
a task which has not been attempted before. Significantly, this task
has fallen to a Professor of Social Administration and an English
professor of law who has become Americanised. The present state
of the judiciary, legal profession and legal education in England,
which are meticulously described by the authors, is the reason why
no English lawyer has critically examined his country's legal system.
In "The Anatomy of Britain", Anthony Sampson pointed out that,
in the nineteenth century, the Church was above attack although the
Monarchy was openly criticised while in the twentieth century the
positions were reversed. The judiciary appears to be in the same
position as the Monarchy. The judges of the modern High Court seem
to be sacrosanct symbols of Authority who must be left inviolate.
In the last fifty years, Their Lordships have made effective use of
their contempt power in punishing any citizens who have had the
temerity to question their dignified and peculiar position. The authors
have taken on the whole legal system and have written a critical study
with taste and understatement.
Lawyers and the Courts is a difficult book to review because it
contains so much detail and yet, on the other hand, can be assessed
on a few broad themes, including the attitude toward the judiciary.
Other categories of discontent are the animosity between the solicitors
and the barristers, the anomalous government of the profession and
the strange state of legal education. All of these, including the role
of the judiciary, have their roots in the English attitude toward the
law. The authors believe that the English lawyers "have restricted
their interests primarily to the 'law' which is concerned with courts"
(at 2). This attitude, which I have no reason to dispute, explains
many things; it shows the basis for the reverence in which the
judiciary is held as well as the fact that the judges have been loath
to decide new points of law or to usurp what they view as the func-
tion of the legislature. This has created a very mechanical attitude
toward case-law and a desire to avoid statutory law wherever possible.
One need hardly add that the training of the lawyers, particularly
barristers, has been restricted so that advocacy, good breeding and
a sound classical education have been more important than an aca-
demic education in the tax law, labour law or criminal law.
If "law" is meant to be a reflection of society as well as an
"external" method of regulation, then perhaps the English are satis-
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fled with this narrow attitude toward the law and the role of the
legal profession. The lawyers and judges have imposed on themselves
a false separation of powers (while operating under the control of
the exceptional office of the Lord Chancellor). I have always been
intrigued by the English "worship" of the common law (ahd I use
the term "worship" advisedly). One day an American psychiatrist
will make a study of the significance of the English lawyer's sub-
conscious attitudes toward the common law. Surely there is some
significance in the descriptions which are applied to the common law.
Whenever a judge speaks at a bar dinner, he refers to Our Lady of
the Common Law (meaning the blindfolded figure of Justice, pre-
sumably), the majesty of the common law, the mystery of the com-
mon law, the law being a hard mistress or, to quote Lord Simonds,
who referred in Shaw v. D.P.P. to the "unravished remnants of the
common law" (cited at 303). The sanctified position of the common
law can hardly be exaggerated. Holdsworth in his History of the
English Law says of Lord Mansfield's attempts to reform the law:
"An attempt to rationalise the common law by the help of pure
reason and foreign analogies could not succeed, because the principles
founded on this basis could be proved to be contrary to ascertained
principles of the common law." (cited at 18).
Professors Smith and Stevens trace the origins of these attitudes
in an excellent historical chapter "The English Legal System, 1750-
1825". The stability (or stagnation) of English legal institutions is
incredible. The centralisation of the "royal" or senior courts in
London has had many serious and permanent effects. It ensured
the entrenched power of the Inns (and the resulting subjection of
the solicitors), the hardships on litigants and defendants outside
London who were deterred from going to law by the added cost and
inconvenience, the continuing mediocrity (or worse) of local justice,
particularly in criminal matters, and the senior courts' preoccupation
with property law. These historical effects are still being felt. The
delays and elaborate formalism of the High Court caused many dis-
putes to be referred to quasi-judicial or administrative agencies. An
1874 Report of the Judicature Commission described the discontent
of parties in commercial disputes who vainly wanted the courts to
give them prompt settlement: (at 81) "Frequently litigation in the
courts 'inflicts on the suitor a long-pending, worrying law-suit, the
solicitors on either side pleading in their clients' interests every tech-
nical point, and thus engendering a bitterness which destroys all future
confidence, and puts an end to further mercantile dealings'." The Inns
of Court made second-class citizens out of the solicitors and in the
barristers' opposition to the "junior" profession having a right to
appear in county courts impeded the growth of those less costly and
more expeditious courts. The powers of the Inns (and more recently
the Bar Council) have caused delays in reforms some of which are
still awaiting implementation, e.g., the fusion of the profession, the
tortious liability of barristers, the introduction of universal legal aid
and the abolition of the "two-thirds" rule when a junior barrister
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appears in court with a silk. These complaints are relatively minor
compared with the stultifying climate which the profession (particu-
larly its "senior" side) and the Bench have created by their adherence
to meaningless tradition and smug self-preservation. The state of
legal education, for instance, is still primitive because the priesthood
of the bar and bench are satisfied with a system of "training" which
accentuates form and rote learning and is openly antagonistic (or
at least apathetic) toward academic legal education in the universities.
Admittedly, the Inns have given some recognition to an academic
legal education but it has even less significance than in the educa-
tional requirements for admission to the roll of solicitors. In a recent
re-examination of legal education of solicitors, the Law Society has
taken the retrograde step of formally recognising "Gibson and
Weldon U". This development has occurred despite frequent attempts
in the last one hundred and fifty years to establish a national School
of Law. (In particular, see pp. 172-174 for one example of the Inns'
indifference and lack of cooperation in attempts to regularize, and
probably improve, legal education on a formal and semi-academic
basis).
Although there are some reasons for not being smug about
Canadian legal education, the improvements made in this country
in the last ten years make comparison with the English situation
nothing short of pitiful. In describing the vain attempts to improve
legal education the authors state:
"Law teachers were regarded as a 'very inferior set of people who mainly
teach because they cannot make a success of the bar'. Far from trying
to teach law in the light of developments in political science and econo-
mics, their teaching consisted of encouraging their students to memorize
legal rules uncritically and without reference to their social utility or
practical operation; and the writings of such academics were restricted
to analysing doctrines within the verbal framework used by the judges."
(at 183-184)
In the nineteen-thirties, the law schools of the United States
were one hundred years ahead of English legal education. The authors
believe that low regard for academic law created such a depressing
atmosphere that the great early teachers at Oxford (Holland, Dicey,
Anson and Maitland) failed to reproduce themselves in the twentieth
century. Obviously something was wrong when Holdsworth could
express the view to a 1929 Committee that no enquiry into legal
education was needed as it "could hardly be improved". (at 185).
A barrister also told Laski, who had been impressed by American
legal education, that "when I balance a law school against Grand
Night at the Inner Temple, my stomach rebels against scholarship".
Although a progressive judge in Lord Atkin advocated the case
method of teaching, another judge told Laski that "the student who
studied disconnected cases lost sight of principles". (at 184). It also
seems incredible that as late as 1948 Dr. Stallybrass of Oxford could
state, in a Presidential Address to the Society of the Public Teachers
of Law, that he was "sure that the Oxford Law School 'has been
wise in excluding from its course those branches of the Law which
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depend on Statute and not on precedent'." Nor did his concept of a
liberal education include speculation about the law, "with what ought
to be and not what is." Such a radical departure as criticizing the
existing law and thinking about what it ought to be
"... gets us near to the field of sociology. My own profound conviction
at the present day is that the first essential of University teaching is
that it should be objective and objectivity is difficult when you come to
Sociology. I feel that that is one of the great dangers of the increasing
development of social studies in the University." (at 366)
The situation has improved to some extent but the authors are
still able to describe the legal education in English universities in the
following terms:
"Legal philosophy continued to be concerned primarily with the linguistic
problems involved in the analysis of doctrinal issues; books about prece-
dent and evidence still tended to be collections of rules about precedent
and evidence. The same was true for statutory interpretation. There was
little attempt to discover the fundamental bases of precedent, evidence
or statutory interpretation or the role they played in the legal process.
It was still not regarded as the task of academics to formulate new
doctrines for meeting changing conditions. International law was still
generally taught independently from international relations and diplo-
matic history. Constitutional law was still divorced from politics and
political science; and administrative lawyers still regarded themselves
as having little concern with the problems of civil service or public ad-
ministration. Meanwhile, in widely studied subjects like tort and contract,
there was still remarkably little research in practical problems-whether
it was the scope of arbitration, the development of commercial practices,
the growth of contract law outside the courts, or the impact of insurance
on the law of torts." (at 372)
This "Conservation Triumphant" was not limited to legal educa-
tion. Junior members of the Inns had objected to the autocracy of
the benchers but their attempts to inject democratic principles into
these legal fraternities failed again and again. A 1958 enquiry into
the operations of the Chancery Division, which uncovered an "intoler-
able" state of affairs, made mild suggestions for reform which had
already been made in 1926 and 1874 and were again ignored. While
the judges were unable to see themselves in a reforming role, there
is a certain irony in the fact that they were able to leave the lofty
heights of the bench and play a constructive role as heads of Royal
Commissions and Departmental Enquiries. This state of affairs has
its parallel in Canada. The situation was not totally bleak because
in the last decade the Evershed Committee, which approved of the
establishment of a Law Reform Committee, "felt that this was not
the whole answer and that there was still an important law-making
role for the judges":
"We do not think that this method of clarifying the law fully meets the
public need. Legislation is a slow and cumbersome process. Parliamentary
time is in modern conditions notoriously limited, and may well become in
the future even more precious. Clarification of the law by judicial decision
is a swifter and surer process, which can go forward at all times without
regard to Parliamentary time and quite independently of political con-
siderations." (at 295)
Perhaps these views and the publication of this book provide
some hope for the future. The authors have performed a valuable
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service to English law. Let us hope that their constructive criticisms
are heeded.
The authors did not set out to write a crusading book. They are
historical and sociological reporters who, with subtlety, allow the
record of wrongheadedness, unenlightened self-interest and rigidity to
speak for itself. Only in the short Preface and Epilogue do they state
their own views with any directness. Because I agree with their aims,
I wish that they had given the reader a longer Preface and Epilogue
but, as I have said, this was not their task. I found that the long
descriptions of innumerable committee reports rather heavy going
at times, but the authors obviously felt the need to document their
case beyond dispute.
I would like to add one note as to the format of the book. I have
no quarrel with the typography or lay-out but surely it is time that
English publishers emulated their American competitors and applied
some first class British craftsmanship to the exterior of their books.
The book cover is dull and lacking in imagination.
GRAHAM C. E. PARKER, LL.B., LL.M.
of the Osgoode Hall Faculty of Law
of York University.
THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE. JoHN KENNETH GALBRAITH.
Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston: 1967. ($9.25)
The New Industrial State looks at the American economy from
an unorthodox angle, and thereby erects a new economic theory
which, according to Galbraith, more accurately explains reality than
today's textbook wisdom. Indeed, it is as an exercise in the correction
of conventional wisdom that this book has its initial impact on the
reader. A second reading reveals implications for future reform and
social policy.
A preliminary limitation on Galbraith's thesis is its focus on
what he calls the "Industrial System". It is that part of the economy
which is composed of the "large corporations". Galbraith indicates
that if pressed to specifics, he would place the two hundred largest
U.S. corporations in this category. While he admits that this is not
the only significant sector of the economy, it is clear that Galbraith
sees it as the most dynamic aspect of modern economic life, perhaps
the new norm, and increasingly the way of the future.
The factor which predominantly determines the character of the
"Industrial System" is technology, "the systematic application of
scientific or other organized knowledge". There are two prime im-
peratives which flow from the fact of technology, and which serve
to explain much of the nature of the large corporation.
The first of these is planning. Because extremely complex fac-
tors must be combined and vast amounts of capital committed many
years before the technologically sophisticated product reaches the
buyer, careful planning becomes vital. Uncertainties are anathema
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